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Abstract
In many countries poker is one of the most popular card games. Although each variant of poker
has its own rules, all involve the use of money to make the challenge meaningful. Nowadays,
in the collective consciousness, some variants of poker are referred to as games of skill, others as
gambling. A poker table can be viewed as a psychology lab, where human behavior can be observed
and quantified. This work provides a preliminary analysis of the role of rationality in poker games,
using a stylized version of Texas Hold’em. In particular, we compare the performance of two
different kinds of players, i.e., rational vs irrational players, during a poker tournament. Results
show that these behaviors (i.e., rationality and irrationality) affect both the outcomes of challenges
and the way poker should be classified.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today modeling human behavior has become one of the most challenging topics in several
scientific areas, e.g., psychology, social psychology, artificial intelligence and also statistical
mechanics. In particular, sociophysics [1–3], or social dynamics [4], address social systems,
linguistics [5, 6], and also human behavior, adopting a strongly interdisciplinary approach,
based mainly on the statistical mechanics framework. Several aspects of social and human
behavior have been modeled in the context of network theory [1, 7, 8], spanning from pro-
cesses over social networks to analytical models based on spin glass dynamics [9, 10]. We
argue that poker games (hereinafter simply poker) could be considered as a natural environ-
ment and as a computational framework for studying human behavior [11]. In particular,
starting from this observation, we aim to introduce a well-known debate in the poker world:
Is Poker a skill game? This question is still considered an open problem, and the answer
has a long list of implications [12, 13]. Considering poker as gambling involves legal issues
that vary from country to country and it also needs to be approached from a public health
perspective (e.g., psychological dependence). In particular, the reason underlying these
problems is associated with the use of money to play poker. Regardless of its classification
(i.e., skill or gambling), poker is gaining prominence, to the point of being considered a sport
or even a profession. Poker is probably the most popular card game and much research in
artificial intelligence has focused on devising algorithms to make machines capable of play-
ing against humans [14, 15]. From this perspective, codifying behavior such as the ‘bluffs’
(later described), widely used both by experts and by amateurs, is not an easy task [16].
On the other hand computing a large number of solutions, in games such as chess, is now
possible thanks to both artificial intelligence algorithms [17] and modern computational
resources (e.g., high-frequency CPUs and parallel architectures). There are several poker
variants, e.g., Texas Hold’em, Omaha, Draw, etc., each having its own rules. However, they
all follow a similar logic, i.e., a number of cards is distributed among players, who in turn
have to decide whether to play or not, considering the possible combinations of their cards
(called hand) with those on the table. Firstly, the players place a bet (money or chips),
after having evaluated whether their hand could be the strongest. Hence, the use of money
is fundamental to make the challenge meaningful, otherwise none of the players would have
a reason to fold their hand. There are two main formats of playing poker, i.e., cash games
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or taking part in a tournament. In a tournament players pay an entry fee that goes into the
prize pool plus a fee to play and receives a certain amount in chips. Only the top players
share the prize pool (usually money). Of course the players’ behavior is very important for
increasing the chances of winning a poker challenge. In particular, once players are dealt
their hand, they have to decide whether or not to enter the pot (i.e., to play their hand) and
if so, how much to bet. There are a number of betting rounds, where players try to evaluate
the strength of their opponents hands (in terms of probability of winning the pot). During
this phase, numerous variables are taken into account, e.g., the value of one’s own hand, the
size of the opponents’ bet, the time opponents take to decide whether to bet or not, and so
on. Hence, some kind of psychological analysis is performed by players during the challenge.
As mentioned above, players can bluff [18], i.e., their behavior can deceive their opponents
about the true strength of their hand. The derivation of the word poker suggests that it is
mainly a game about bluffing and hence a psychological game. Going back to the previous
question, concerning the role of skills in poker, many conflicting considerations emerge and
the matter is still open to debate as there is no definitive answer [19]. Here, we analyze
this topic from a new perspective. In particular, we define a simple model, inspired by the
Texas Hold’em variant, where agents play heads up challenges (i.e., agents faces just one
opponent at a time) to win a tournament. In so doing, tournaments have a tree structure,
where agents face each other, until only the last two players take part in the final challenge.
Agents can behave rationally, i.e., they take decisions by evaluating their hands, or they
can behave irrationally, i.e., they play randomly. Therefore, by comparing the performance
of agents behaving in opposite ways, we aim to provide a preliminary answer about the
role of rationality in poker. Although a comparison between rational strategies and random
strategies may appear trivial, it is worth noting that, in some real scenarios such as stock
markets, random trading strategies have been proven to be more useful than those based
on ‘rational algorithms’ (e.g., by using statistical patterns) [20, 21]. Therefore, investiga-
tions conducted in this work also represent a further attempt to evaluate the strength and
the efficiency of random strategies in ‘partial information games’ [22]. Moreover, we also
analyze these dynamics considering that rational agents can become irrational if, due to a
series of bad hands, they lose a lot of money (or chips). The main result of the simulations
shows that, in the presence of a small number of rational agents, rationality is fundamental
to success. Therefore, the classification of poker as a skill game does not depend on the
3
game itself (i.e., its rules), but on the players behavior. Furthermore, it is worth noting that
when agents do change their behavior (i.e., from rational to irrational) this strongly affects
the outcomes of the proposed model, further highlighting the key role of human behavior in
poker games. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the
proposed model, for comparing the performance of rational and irrational agents. Section III
presents the results of the numerical simulations. Lastly, Section IV concludes the paper.
II. THE MODEL
In the proposed model, we consider poker challenges which involve two opponents at a
time. Furthermore, we use as reference a famous variation of poker called Texas Hold’em.
A brief description of Texas Hold’em is provided in the Appendix. In so doing, we represent
tournaments consisting of ‘heads up’ challenges, where winning agents compete until such
time as only two opponents contend for first place. The agents behavior drives their actions
during the challenges, i.e., they can be rational or irrational. In order to evaluate their
hands, rational agents use the Sklansky table [23], a statistical reference for Texas Hold’em
players. On the other hand, irrational agents play randomly, hence they do not consider
either the potential value of their hands or other factors. The structure of each challenge,
between two agents, represents a simplified version of a real scenario, as only one betting
phase is performed (see Appendix for further details). Hence, rational agents act considering
only the first two cards (i.e., their hand). Moreover, we let blinds (i.e., minimum bets posted
by players) increase over time, as actually happens in poker tournaments. As in the real
game, agents have to select among a set of possible actions: call, bet, raise, and fold –see
Appendix. Generally, the first three actions involve the agent partaking in the pot, whereas
the fourth represents withdrawal. Comparing the performance of two agents, one rational
versus one irrational, it is possible to compute the probability Pwr that rational agents will
win a single challenge. Results of this preliminary analysis show that Pwr ∈ [0.8 − 0.85].
Therefore, a rational agent wins about W = 3 consecutive challenges against an irrational
one. It is worth observing that W can be computed analytically once Pwr is known. In
particular, considering n consecutive challenges, the probability that the rational agent wins
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n times is
Pr = P
w
r · Pwr · ... · Pwr︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
= (Pwr )
n (1)
Therefore, as n increases the value of Pr decreases. As W corresponds to the maximum
value of n such that Pr ≥ 0.5, we get n = 3, then W = 3. Furthermore, the value W = 3 has
been confirmed also by performing 1000 numerical simulations of challenges between two
agents of different kinds (i.e., rational vs irrational). In principle, considering the tree-like
structure of heads up tournaments, a rational agent should be able to win when N ≤ 2W .
Hence, under this hypothesis, the proposed model yields the minimum theoretical density
of rational agents (i.e., ρˆr) to be able to consider poker as a ‘skill game’. In accordance with
the value of W derived above, the value of ρˆr can be computed as
ρˆr =
1
2W
(2)
recall that Eq. 2 considers a tree-like structure of a heads up tournament. Since W = 3, we
get ρˆr = 0.125.
A. Modeling variations of players’ behavior
Professional poker players, and generally expert players, know that adopting statistics-
based strategies is only useful when they have a sufficient amount of chips (or money),
otherwise an almost irrational strategy based on ‘all-in’ actions is more incisive [23]. In
particular, going ‘all-in’ means that the player bets all her/his chips, in this case behaving
almost irrationally as this move is driven not by the value of the hand but by the shortage
of chips. Furthermore, it is worth noting that a rational player can also take this extreme
action losing her/his patience after a consecutive series of bad hands, (i.e., she/he becomes
irrational). For the sake of simplicity, we model this phenomenon as follows: in the event
a rational agent loses more than the half the amount of its starting capital (i.e., the initial
amount of chips or money), while playing against an irrational agent, it can become irrational
with the following probability
p(R→ I) = 1− C(t)/C(0) (3)
with p(R → I) transition probability from rational to irrational behavior, C(t) amount
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of chips at time t, and C(0) starting amount of chips. Recall that Eq. 3 is computed
iff at a given time t the rational agent has less than C(0)
2
chips while playing against an
irrational agent. Note that usually, in real scenarios, players are able to recognize whether
their opponents are completely irrational, as players have to show their hand after the last
betting phase (see Appendix). Hence, actions disjointed by the value of the related hands
are promptly identified and they result also quite different from unsuccessful attempts of
bluff. Therefore the assumption underlying the proposed model (i.e., rational agents can
become irrational only when they play against irrational opponents), is not too far from
reality.
III. RESULTS
In order to study the proposed model, we performed a large number of numerical sim-
ulations of tournaments with N = 4096 agents (i.e., players). We consider three control
parameters:
• the density of rational agents ρr,
with ρr ∈ [0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.125, 0.25, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.6];
• the starting stack S assigned to agents for each single challenge (i.e., the initial amount
of fiches), with S ∈ [0.5k, 1k, 2k, 5k, 10k, 20k];
• the sequence Σ of blinds (see Appendix).
In particular, we analyze two different sequences Σ:
1. Σ1 = {0.01k, 0.02k, 0.05k, 0.1k, 0.15k, 0.3k, 0.5k, 0.8k, 1k, 1.5k, 3k, 5k, 10k, 20k}
2. Σ2 = 0.1k
The sequence Σ1 is similar to those used in real tournaments where the blinds gradually
increase. On the other hand, Σ2 does not represent a real scenario, but it is interesting to
investigate the outcomes of the proposed model in the event blinds do not vary over time.
Lastly, every 10 time steps blinds increase in accordance with the considered Σ. We found
that, as ρr approaches 0.25, the probability of a rational agent winning a tournament is
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FIG. 1. Probability that a rational agent wins a tournament varying ρr (i.e., density of rational
agents). a Results achieved by the blinds sequence Σ1. b Results achieved by the blinds sequence
Σ2. As indicated in the legends, each curve refers to a different starting stack S. Dotted lines
indicate ρˆr, i.e., the minimal theoretical density of rational agents to get always a rational winner:
the yellow line refers to 2 players, whereas the black one to tournaments. Results are averaged
over 1000 simulations.
higher than 0.95 (for all values of S). In particular, as S increases the minimum ρr, to get
a rational winner, decreases —see panel a of Figure 1.
As ρr → 0.4, Pwr → 1 for all values of S. Then, we analyzed how the probability Pwr varies
in function of the starting stack S. Note that, as shown in Figure 2, considering a different
number of rational agents no relationship exists between the value of S and Pw. Lastly, we
performed simulations considering constant blinds over time, i.e., Σ2. Panel b of Figure 1
shows that increasing S, the minimum density ρr, to get a rational winner, decreases. In
particular, the value of Pw exceeds 0.8 as ρr = 0.01. Therefore, by using constant blinds,
rational agents are at a great advantage.
A. Changes of behavior
Here, we show the results obtained considering that rational agents, under the above
described conditions (see Section II), can become irrational. In this case, control parameters
have the following values:
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FIG. 2. Probability that a rational agent wins a tournament varying the starting stack S. As
indicated in the legend, each symbol refers to a different density ρr of rational agents, and dotted
lines indicate the related average values. Results are averaged over 1000 simulations.
• ρr ∈ [0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.05, 0.075, 0.1, 0.125, 0.15,
0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9];
• the starting stack S assigned to agents for each single challenge (i.e., the initial amount
of chips), with S ∈ [0.5k, 1k, 2k, 5k, 10k, 20k];
• the sequence of blinds is Σ1
Figure 3 illustrate how the probability Pw increases as ρr increases. We observe that the
starting stack S is irrelevant, since the value of Pw is the same in all cases. Notably, we found
that these curves (i.e., those related to Pw varying ρr) can be well fitted by the function
Pw(ρr) = 1− e−λ·ρr (4)
with λ ≈ 4.1, estimated by the non-linear least squares fitting method. Therefore, the
system behavior seems to have a non-linear relation with the amount of rational agents.
Since rational agents can change behavior over time, becoming irrational, we analyze the
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FIG. 3. Probability that a rational agent wins a tournament, by considering transitions R → I
(i.e., from the rational to the irrational strategy), varying ρr (i.e., density of rational agents). As
indicated in the legend, each continuos curve refers to a different starting stack S, whereas the
black dotted curve refers to computed fitting function. Results are averaged over 1000 simulations.
average number of transitions R → I, i.e., transitions from rational to irrational behavior
—see Figure 4. We note that, in qualitative terms, the histogram of < #transitions > (i.e.,
average number of transitions R → I) has a Gaussian-like form, peaked in ρr = 0.5. As
before, we did not find any correlation between the analyzed parameter (i.e., in this case
< #transitions >) and the initial stack S provided to all agents.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our proposed model allows to compute the minimum theoretical density of rational agents
to be able to consider poker as a ‘skill game’. We implemented two different versions of the
model. The basic version considers agents with constant behavior i.e., rational agents always
play rationally, and irrational ones play always irrationally. The second version of the model
allows rational agents to become irrational under opportune conditions. The main result of
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FIG. 4. Average number of transitions from rational to irrational behavior, varying ρr (i.e., density
of rational agents). Results are averaged over 1000 simulations.
the numerical simulations, for both versions of the proposed model, suggests a preliminary
answer to the above popular question ‘’Is Poker a skill game?: It depends on the players’
behavior”. This preliminary answer highlights the paramount importance of human behavior
in poker games. In the first variant of the model, we compared two different sequences
of blinds and found that the structure of tournaments also plays an important role. For
instance, in the event blinds do not vary over time, rational agents are greatly advantaged.
This latter phenomenon is widely known to poker players because as blinds increases so too
do the risks, therefore the ‘luck factor’ can prevail over the players skills. On the other hand,
we found that the initial stack (S) has little effect on these dynamics (see Figure 2). This
result warrants further analysis as usually, in real scenarios, the initial stack is deemed a
significant parameter. The second variant of the model, provided further insights. Firstly, it
is worth observing that the curve Pw(ρr) can be well fitted by Eq. 4, therefore we identified
a non-linear quantitive relation between the amount of rational players and the nature of
poker. Furthermore, the maximum ρr value for increasing the number of transitions (R→ I)
is ρr = 0.5. This is not surprising as for lower values of ρr there are fewer rational agents who
can change their behavior. Instead, for values greater than 0.5, there are too many rational
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players to trigger the transition (recall the transition can happen only when a rational agent
plays against an irrational one). Here again, the parameter S seems irrelevant. Lastly, we
compared the two scenarios (i.e., the two variants of the model). As shown in Figure 5, when
poker is played with agents who do not change their behavior over time, it resembles a skill
game more closely, whereas when their behavior changes, then the nature of the game tends
more to gambling. In Figure 5, we identify two theoretical curves to discriminate between
FIG. 5. Probability that a rational agent wins a tournament varying ρr (i.e., density of rational
agents). The red curve denotes agents with constant behavior (defined CB in the legend), i.e.,
rational agents cannot become irrational. The blue curve denotes the variant of the proposed
model where rational agents can vary their behavior (defined V B in the legend) under opportune
conditions.In both cases, the curves refer to the results obtained with S = 500 (with S starting
stack). The black curve represents the step function, whereas the green one the simple linear
function Pw = ρr. The  on the ρr axis corresponds to the minimum theoretical density of rational
agents in a tournament (e.g., if N = 1000 then  = 1N = 0.001). Results are averaged over 1000
simulations.
skill games and gambling. A step function (whose minimum value  corresponds to the
minimum theoretical density of rational agents in a tournament) identifies pure skill games,
inasmuch as in the presence of only one rational agent, it wins the tournament (e.g., Chess).
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On the other hand, the linear function Pw(ρr) = ρr represents gambling (e.g., if ρr = 0.3
then the Pw = 0.3). Comparing the distance of a curve, obtained for a particular game, from
the two theoretical ones described above (i.e., the skill and the gambling curve) may also be
useful for defining the nature of other games, hence it could prove a valuable quantitative
evaluation tool. In brief, we found that, even if only a few players play rationally, rationality
becomes a fundamental ingredient to success. As a consequence, poker can be considered
a skill game only when its players behave rationally. Therefore, in these games human
behavior is more important than the rules themselves for understanding the nature of the
game. To conclude, although it would be extremely interesting to compare the outcomes of
the proposed model with real data, this is not possible as no similar datasets exist. For single
challenges, it may be possible to evaluate whether a player is adopting mainly a random
strategy or a rational strategy. Moreover, in real scenarios, a completely random strategy
is adopted by very few players. It is worth recalling that, in this context, we focused the
attention on evaluating whether a comparison between a random vs a rational strategy may
provide a preliminary answer as to the nature of Poker. As for future work, we aim to further
analyze the proposed model in order to make it as realistic as possible and to represent other
kinds of human behavior observable during poker challenges.
APPENDIX
Here, we briefly illustrate the basic rules of one of the most well-known variants of poker,
namely Texas Hold’em [23]. Let us consider two players playing a heads up challenge. At
the beginning of the challenge, both players have an equal stack of chips (e.g., 10000$).
The winner is the agent who wins all the chips from its opponent. Each round is won by
the agent with the best combination of five cards, computed from the seven available (a
further explanation is given below). Each round (say time step) of the challenge comprises
four phases, where agents have to decide whether to place a bet or fold, depending on their
cards and on the strategy adopted by their opponent. They are dealt two cards (their hand)
and then place a small amount of chips in the pot (the prize for the single round composed
of all the bets), then the round begins. During each phase, agents have to select among
the following actions: call, fold, bet, and raise. To call means to put in the pot the same
amount of chips as their opponent. To fold means to drop out of the hand, in which case
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the opponent wins the whole pot and the round ends. To bet means to increase the pot
using some of the chips. In this case, the opponent has to decide whether to accept to post
the same amount of chips or not. Lastly, to raise means to increase the bet posted by the
opponent. These betting phases alternate during each single round. During the first phase
(i.e., the pre-flop) agents only have their own (2) cards. Then in the second phase, called
flop, three cards are dealt onto the table. Now, in the turn phase, a further card is shown.
Lastly, during the river phase, the last card is dealt. As discussed before, the winner is the
agent with the best combination of five cards, using the cards in their hand and those on
the table (called community cards that can be used by both players). In the event the best
combination is composed of the community cards, both agents win, and each one receives
half the pot. During the above described phases, the agents decide the best of the above
actions to take in order to win the pot. One important aspect to highlight when describing
a poker challenge, concerns time. Every time a player makes a bet, there exists a minimum
number of chips that can be posted called blind. The size of the blind increases over time
at regular time intervals (e.g., 15 minutes, 20 minutes, etc.). Therefore, first rounds are
usually characterized by small pots, whereas the last rounds are much richer. Finally, the
challenge ends when one agent wins all the chips from its opponent. Although the basic
rules of Texas Hold’em are fairly simple, even with the aid of a device for computing winning
probabilities (of each hand), it is not so easy to win a challenge. In particular, many kinds
of psychological behavior drive players during the selection of their actions. Particularly, as
discussed before, the opportunity to perform bluffs makes this game non-trivial.
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